The First Air Battle - 3rd Sep 1965

The First Air Battle - 3rd September 1965

    Gp Capt Mohan "Manna" Murdeshwar is one of the few', who flew with the elite Gnat Units during the 1965 war. He had the privilege of participating in all of the air combats that No.23 Squadron was involved in, including the historic air battle on 3rd September 1965 when Squadron Leader Trevor Keelor scored the first aerial victory for the Indian Air Force. This is his side of the story.

   When dawn unfolded on the morning of 1st Sept, 1965, on the Green Fields of Ambala airport, we of No. 23 Sqn. AF did not realize what was in store for us. The “buchi woochies” ( hairy caterpillars) of Green Fields had crept onto our flying overalls and ‘g’ suits and we were busy brushing these off when word was transmitted to detach 4 Gnats to Halwara for ORP duties. ORP duties were routine in those days, so not many eyebrows were raised. Sikand, Pat, Gill and Kitcha were accordingly instructed “to get there!”

   On 2nd Sept, 65 at about 1000 hrs, instructions received from WAC named Johnny Greene, Manna Murdeshwar, AJS Sandhu and Trevor Keelor to fly four armed Gnats to Pathankot. Johnny and Sandhu, thus became attached to No. 23 Sqn. We took off in the afternoon of the same day in a low level abreast formation .

   We landed at Pathankot, at sunset and while taxiing to the dispersal I was greeted by dejected and sad looking faces of course mates & others standing alongside the taxiway. It was only when we all walked out to the Technical Area, that we learnt of the four Vampires that had been shot down on their attempt to neutralise the large scale Pak Army’s thrust towards Akhnoor.

    We were unaware of this major Pak operation and the consequence of Indian Army’s SOS to the IAF  for air support that resulted in the rather misguided deployment of the ineffective Vampires from Pune. This , if I may call it, was a foolish endeavour, as it resulted in the loss of four Vampires and three pilots (one bailed out). The apparent intention of the Pak Army was to make a rapid thrust from the Chamb-Jauhria sector to the Akhnoor bridge, thereby cutting off J & K State from India. The unfortunate decision of deploying Vampires against well- armed Pak forces was a reflection of the poor analysis and decision making abilities of our then, rather naive leadership.

   When we assembled at the temporary makeshift office given to us, we were pleasantly surprised to find Sikand and his team also present. On their landing at Halwara, they were redirected to Pathankot. Thus, there were eight of us comprising the No. 23 Sqn. Dett. Sikand, though senior most, realised he was not an experienced combat pilot and therefore graciously asked Johnny to become the leader of the Dettachment..

    The so called brief given to us on 02 Sept late evening, was only to develop any suitable tactics that would result in at least one Sabre casualty. Two Mystere Squadrons based at Pathankot could also be included to evolve any tactics that would yield the desired results. Johnny with the concurrence of the Mysteres’ Commanders drew out a plan that would draw the Sabres onto the Mysteres flying at about 20,000 ft. whence they would paint on the Pak radar. The Gnats at tree top heights, would then climb up to engage the Sabres. That would be the indication for the Mysteres to swoop low and return to base.

   On completion of the plans, we trudged along to the Officers’ Mess where we learnt that no rooms were available for us. It was already about 2130 hrs so we had our dinner, pulled a few charpoys outside a room and slept in our flying overalls. At about 3 am we were woken up, and clutching our flying gear, sleepily trudged along to the dispersal with no vehicle, bearer, or tea in sight! “Wheels up” was scheduled at 0600 hrs. After the Met briefing, all eight of us taxied out and waited for the Mysteres to get air borne. We then took off in formations, fully armed with guns and drop tanks to cater for the low level flight and air combat, that was likely to ensue.

   It must be appreciated that the Pak radar was far superior to ours. While the Sabres were always within sight of Pak radars, our 230 SU at Amritsar and the 501 SU at Barnala, were not as efficient to control and guide or warn us of any threat that could develop.

   As we arrived at the Chamb sector, the Mysteres at height, were picked up by Pak radar and as foreseen the Sabres arrived to meet them. At 501 SU’s warning, the Mysteres, dropped height and both our Gnat formations moved up to engage the Sabres.

   We were in a finger four aircraft formation, led by Johnny and self, as No.2, Sikand No.3 & Pat No.4. The rear formation were spread out abreast, as normally done, led by Trevor, with No,2 Gill, No.3 Sandhu, & No.4 Kitcha.

   In the combat that followed, a lone Sabre was spotted behind me prompting Trevor to call a starboard ‘break’. Siki, unable to maintain position, fell off, and disappeared from sight. Pat, who also ‘got out of phase’, spotted a F104 & turned into him hoping for a possible engagement, but without success. Both Johnny's & my ‘ break’ made the Sabre fall out, placing it in front of Trevor who successfully fired at the Sabre. Sandhu who followed, also fired a few more shots, for luck!

   Johnny & I landed together, with Pat & the rest following at intervals. Siki unfortunately was not with us and we learnt later that he had landed in Pakistan. That brought to a close the first day's air battle.

   The shooting down of a Sabre brought much joy to WAC. Trevor was recommended for a Vir Chakra (VrC) which was promptly announced in the evening’s News Bulletin over All India Radio. ( But much after the hostilities were over, we learnt that the ‘shot down Sabre’ had purportedly, landed at its base full of bullet holes). Nevertheless, it was a memorable air battle and the kudos were rightly earned, since it raised the morale of the Service and the country!

Article First Published in Bharath Rakshak written by Written by Gp Capt Mohan Murdeshwar

Why should we remember the 1965 India-Pakistan war?

Why should we remember the 1965 India-Pakistan war?

   Fifty years have passed, since the Indian Army, taken by surprise by Pakistani infiltrators, fought back to finally get the better of eventual military exchanges. The war, fought across both the Line of Control and the international border, saw India capture larger tracts of Pakistani territory and attain a military advantage.

   An analysis of the 1965 Indo-Pak war from a strategic perspective remains relevant for a number of reasons. This is facilitated by a reasonably long period of fifty years, which provide an opportunity to objectively assess its significance, with the proverbial benefit of hindsight.

    It was a mere three years prior to the war in 1965 that India had been defeated by the Chinese in 1962. This was not merely a military defeat, but also a serious blow to the pride of the country and its armed forces. Despite this setback, the soldiers and their leaders did not display any adverse sign of the debacle against Pakistan. The Indian soldier excelled despite fearful odds.

     The war threw up a number of outstanding tactical victories, as well as individual stories of bravery. This is best illustrated by the valour displayed in bloody battles like Haji Pir, Dograi and Asal Uttar. At Haji Pir, the armed forces launched one of the finest attacks, deep into Pakistani territory to capture the pass. Major Ranjt Singh Dayal, who led this force, became a household name. The battle of Dograi, is unique in the annals of Indian military history, wherein 3 JAT, the battalion that was involved, captured the same objective twice, despite erroneously being asked to fall back after the first victory. Asal Uttar is often referred to as "Patton Nagar". It witnessed the destruction of nearly 100 Pakistani tanks on the battlefield. As a result of a number of similar victories, by the end of the war, the armed forces had not only buried the defeat against China, they had also chartered the course for building upon their hard fought victories. This finally became evident during the 1971 Indo-Pak war.

    It is a commonly held belief that India has always held a clear edge in the conventional military sphere against Pakistan. This was certainly the case immediately after independence, however, after the mid fifties, Pakistan embarked on a concerted path to modernise its forces, in the garb of aligning against communism. This saw it receive high end military hardware from the US. In reality, its preparations were clearly aimed at India, as the events of 1965 proved. After the 1962 war, when the US provided India with military hardware, Pakistan, established a special relationship with China, the very country, US had armed it against. India was also disadvantaged during the process of raising new formations after the 1962 war, as most of these were not in a state of preparedness to fight a war. The sudden increase in size had also diluted its professional edge. Pakistan realised these limitations and decided to strike at a time that it considered most advantageous. Therefore, purely from the perspective of military hardware and readiness, Pakistan had a clear edge in 1965. The Indian response and achievements must be seen from this perspective and were therefore all the more commendable.

    Despite some of the notable successes in the face of odds, the war brought home certain important military realities that remain relevant fifty years later as well. Here are five factors, which emerge as the lessons that the armed forces must build upon.

   First, each service fought its individual battles, with limited cohesion in the planning or execution of the war effort. While there has been better coordination achieved over the years, a lot needs to be done to ensure that unity of effort is achieved through the seamless integration of the armed forces.

   Second, the war exposed limitations in the intelligence capability of the country and the armed forces. This has been a recurrent weakness repeatedly exposed thereafter as well. There is a case for investing far more than is presently the case to enhance the capacity of military intelligence as well as internal and external national intelligence agencies.

   Third, the war brought home the reality that military capability cannot be created in a short span of time. The efforts that began after the 1962 war, were inadequate to create the kind of military edge needed to retain conventional military superiority against Pakistan. This is equally relevant in the present context.

   Fourth, the refusal of military and civilian authorities to share the reality of wars and war fighting with the country has led to misinformation and misgivings which are great for sustaining myths, but not objective analysis. The recent initiative to document wars is a step in the right direction, though it should ideally be accompanied by declassification of records to enable scholars to enlarge the debate.

   Fifth, war termination is a reflection of a country's long term strategic assessment of its desired objectives. The aftermath of the 1965 war clearly exposed weaknesses in this regard. It also reinforced the country's adhoc strategic culture. This remains a weakness, with inadequate investment in developing strategic insight amongst leaders, both military and civilian alike.

    As the country celebrates the achievements of the 1965 Indo-Pak war, a simultaneous attempt must be made to ensure that weaknesses if any must be addressed so that the country and its armed forces are prepared to successfully achieve national objectives.

Written By Col Vivek Chada Published in Daily O