PGM's Stocking dosages to Pakistan and China

PGM's Stocking dosages to Pakistan and China

   The future battle would be coming from the air. one who dominates the air who can control the land too, even if the enemy has large number of ground units and associated systems. The current Syrian campaign and the earlier Iraqi invasion are all point outs the need of precision bombs to kill enemy outfits to support the ground units for further advance. In invasions the enemy ground soldiers numbers and support systems will be pinned down any highly trained much modern forces. so the friendly forces in enemy territory always relies on the friendly Air support missions to neutralize enemy strongholds.

    The next war between India and Pakistan becomes a very long time war, with the Liberation of Baluchistan and recapture of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. the Indian Tri services thinks about offensive in case of any misadventures made by Pakistan. after the 26/11 India learned that they have full power to defend the Nation from enemy attack. however they were not ready for a large scale offensive. and the published CAG report also states about the shortage of ammo in early 2008-2013.

    The offensive mission in Syria is another example of the need of precision guided munitions, along with dumb bombs. the dumb bombs are not guided which are mostly used for carpet bombing to pinned down the enemy forces by stopping their advancement. the dumb bombs makes collateral damages making nearby by soft or civilian targets at high risk. precision bombing is much simple and lethal, which is used for pin point strikes, to destroy enemy points lazed by lasers or marked by the friendly forces.

    The US forces used the AC 130 gunships heavily in the Afghan campaign for close air support, since they have full air superiority over the afghan airspace. even the Taliban has less number of MANPAD's which are ineffective against those high flying targets. Even in Syria the Russians enjoying the air superiority and dropping bombs from the air. there is a lesson that Russian showing, by destroying the ISIS and FSA targets using unguided dumb bombs, and the high value sorties from Su 34 comes with KAB 500 GLONASS guided bombs, to destroy rebel positions at high precision. thus gives a good chances to the Syrian and pro government allied ground forces to advance into the rebel occupied territory's.

    During the Desert Storm US dropped two hundred thousands of unguided bombs, and 17,000 guided munitions. and found the precision guided munitions shows much better result than the 200,000 unguided bombs. with the lessons, 1998 Iraqi bombing the Americans dropped more guided munitions than the dumb bombs. later in Afghan campaign they used the PGM's more effectively than the Dumb bombs. in the Afghan campaign US dropped some 9000 unguided bombs along with another 20 thousands of guided munitions. thus shows US slowly moving from the dumb bombs to guided munitions.

    The same goes to Kargil, the IAF found lack of PGM bombs in it's inventory and lack of target designators, when talking about precision bombing in Kargil  Philip says "The Mirage 2000 were supplied with Thomson-CSF Laser Designator Pod, known as ‘ATLIS’ which was capable of delivery of Matra 1000 kg LGBs, which were purpose built for destruction of reinforced targets. These weapons were highly capable but were very expensive." During the Kargil conflict, only Mirage 2000 had the capability to deliver a precision-guided bomb accurately on Tiger Hill, which makes new fighter acquisition and bombs must suited to give proper dosages to both Pakistan and China effectively in high grounds.

   To destroy Pakistani land targets and to stop the Chinese offensive, India need some 40,000 of guided bombs along with another 10K of unguided bombs bombs. which can be armed in both Su 30 MKI and Mirage fleets. even the LCA can be used for continuously bombing Pakistani land targets with the guided bombs. The Su 30 MKI and LCA can strike Mountain targets with laser guided munitions with the use of Litening laser designation pod. and the medium fighters like Mirage and Rafale pound ground targets using satellite guided munitions.  

   compared to missiles, delivering the bombs through fighter jet is best in target strike and economical matters. the Fighter's can engage targets like highly mobile Tanks or Artillery's. and the long range missiles are best for destroying command centers and and other immovable economic corridors.

ISIS plans to wage war in India to provoke an Armageddon

ISIS plans to wage war in India to provoke an Armageddon

   Reports reveals that  ISIS plans to use the Pakistani and Afghani Islamic militants to attack India to start the  Armageddon or end of the world like scenario. American Media Institutes caught a Pakistani deserted soldier who has with several classified informations about the ISIS. a 30 page Urdu document was translated into English by an elite American Harvard University Researcher. the Reports were Later published into the lead US media USA Today. they also get a interview from that Pakistani man but which is not revealed for security concerns about the live of the Pakistani.

  The Report mainly states about attacking US Army Personnel stationing in Afghanistan and American diplomatic officers,  ISIS tries to attack the US bases in Iraq several times but all such attacks were repelled by the US Forces, But in Afghan ISIS has no real grounds or manpower like in Syria and Iraq, Afghan and Pakistan has been dominated by Shia militants like Taliban, even there is a cold war between Taliban and ISIS, But still some good numbers of ISIS based Sunni militants operating secretly in Afghan and Pakistan.

   So ISIS needs a huge manpower to expand their wings outside Syria and Iraq, those countries like Afghan and Pakistan is always having a unstable government because of the terrorism. so with the small ISIS groups inside Afghan and Pakistan can grow the ISIS members numbers  huge in coming months.

   The US intelligence officials also reviewed the reports and said said they believe the document is authentic based on its unique markings and the fact that language used to describe leaders, the writing style and religious wording match other documents from the Islamic State, also known as ISIL and ISIS. They asked to remain anonymous because they are not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

  The undated document, titled “A Brief History of the Islamic State Caliphate (ISC), The Caliphate According to the Prophet,” seeks to unite dozens of factions of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban into a single army of terror.  It includes a never-before-seen history of the Islamic State, details chilling future battle plans, urges al-Qaeda to join the group and says the Islamic State's leader should be recognized as the sole ruler of the world’s 1 billion Muslims under a religious empire called a “caliphate.”

  “Accept the fact that this caliphate will survive and prosper until it takes over the entire world and beheads every last person that rebels against Allah," it proclaims. "This is the bitter truth, swallow it.”

   The document warns that “preparations” for an attack in India are underway and predicts that an attack will provoke an apocalyptic confrontation with America: “Even if the U.S tries to attack with all its allies, which undoubtedly it will, the ummah will be united, resulting in the final battle.” The word “ummah” refers to the entire global community of Muslims.

  Striking in India would magnify the Islamic State’s stature and threaten the stability of the region, said Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution who served more than 30 years in the CIA. “Attacking in India is the Holy Grail of South Asian jihadists.”

  But coming to India one million of Active military personnels can easily kill huge numbers of ISIS terrorists in single attack, If ISIS starts a asymmetric warfare India also suffer in first waves, but this will not happens continuously, India currently suffering asymmetric warfare  done by the Terrorists backed by the Pakistani Army,  the Indians also sounding about heavy retaliations but still no clear attacks against Terrorist positions outside Indian Borders.

   If ISIS comes to attack India in Large numbers, they have to use the Pakistani Borders, as India already learns good lessons in Kargil, this time India will not show any mercy over the Terrorist, they can continue bombs enemy positions with much heavier weapons.

   The ISIS thinks that they can easily takes Indian Border cities just like how they capture cities in Iraq and Syria, where the ISIS comes in large numbers and easily out numbers the government forces, which forced the government forces vacate the area. those Soldiers even don't have enough trainings to hold the positions, also they don't gets resupply or Reinforcements. but the same will not happens in India,

  The Regular Indian Forces has deployed in huge numbers across the Borders, all of them can reach a designated position within a hours as a Massive deployment, and the highly advanced air force also gives support to the soldiers through it's attack jets and Helicopters.

   Even if some thousand of ISIS terrorists attack a small group of Indian Soldiers numbers less than thirty of Fifty, The Indians suddenly informs the scenario to the Army base command, and  the Soldiers will set a defensive positions and start attack enemy forces, it's clear that anyone can hold the ground just some one or two hours because of low numbers and sort of ammunitions. meanwhile the base command already forwarded the message to the Army High command, and the base command inform nearby army bases to send the soldiers to support the soldiers who are pinned by the terrorists, within a hour or minutes it's clear army will masses more than thousands of Soldiers.

   And with the technological advancements The Army will use High Altitude reconnaissance planes and satellites to know the exact positions of the enemy terrorists, and start counter attack, in such a conventional war Indian Army alone take some 24 hours to kill all the infiltrated terrorists. 

   Even if ISIS managed to bring more than 10,000 of terrorists in one wave, It's clear the Army asks supports from Air forces for bombing missions, with the Technical advancement The IAF can manage to assist the friendlies to hold their positions till the  arrival  of  reinforcement units.

   But the ISIS never faces such challenges, earlier the ISIS plans to attack a US Army base in Iraq, The US forces numbered less than Hundred, but ISIS managed to mass 900 numbers, and Attacked in the Night, The US already knows about the Terrorists plans and sets their position for defensive attack, they also asked for Air support from the US marines Aircrafts, before the sun rise the US repelled the ISIS attack and kills almost 200 of terrorists, others flees from the scene.

   The ISIS correctly said about the  Armageddon, if they tries for a war against Indians in Indian Land or near Indian Borders, thats their final day in the earth.

How Indian Air Force made history with the Kargil War

      Operation "Safed Sagar" commenced on May 26, 1999 and concluded on July 11, 1999 after all military objectives were achieved. This was the first time in the history of military aviation that air power was used at a height of upto 32,000 feet by the Indian Air Force.

     From April 1999, the Pakistan Army along with elements of Mujahadeen (irregulars) crossed the 168km Line of Control (LoC), along Kargil and occupied high ground and vantage points. The intrusion was announced by the Indian Army by May 7-8 and had come as a complete surprise to the military as well as intelligence agencies. The decision to induct the IAF was taken on May 24 after due deliberations at the highest levels of the Indian government and instructions were issued to jointly, with the Army, evict the intruders. It was emphasised that the IAF must not cross the LoC.

      The targets were small sangars (shelters made of boulders) and isolated tents. This made close air force support to the army extremely difficult. Initially, the targets were not known to the Indian Army and little or no information was available to the Air Force. The stinger was also formidable. This shoulder fired the missile system, a Canberre aircraft, and managed to hit on a recce mission on May 21. Fortunately, the aircraft returned safely. An Mig 21 was lost on May 27 and an MI-17 Heptr the very next day due to stingers. Thereafter, a change of tactics and attack patterns was necessitated to stay above the stinger "bubble". This implied that weapon delivery would need to be above 26,000ft and upto 32,000ft. At such height, the aircraft performance reduces drastically due to less atmospheric density as also the ballistics of bombs. The piloting skills of the Indian Air Force overcame the difficulties and ensured discernable results.

        The first phase of Air Force operations was to conduct a recce to identify the targets, the second was interdiction, which was to hit the logistics and administration camps that supplied ammunition, food, fuel, et al to the occupied posts in the higher mountain reaches. Then the Air Force moved to the final phase -of providing close air support after the target systems were clearly identified. All the phases were executed in close co-operation with the Army.

          Credit must be given to the Mig 21 and Mig 27 pilots, who, with primitive navigation/attack systems, were very effective. The use of hand held GPS (Global Positioning System) was an innovation that produced great results when used for area targets. The constant bombardment had a tremendously demoralising effect on the adversary's psyche.

        The terrain consisted of the Himalayas running in the northwest-southeast direction, with peaks reaching above 22,000 to 25,000 feet. On the northern side of LoC, the valleys were running in the north-south direction with gradual slopes to the peaks. Most targets were on the northern slopes. This made it rather difficult to evolve a strike pattern without crossing the LoC. Wind speeds were somewhere between 50-100 knots per hour.

          The sun rise cast shadows in the valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. The clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11AM. Therefore, the window of opportunity was only the three-hour period between 8AM and 11AM.

         The tide turned from the middle of June 1999. At this time, the areas of occupation became known. The Army was now in a position to make an attack plan versus the target systems. As a consequence, the Air Force was able to coordinate with the Army the "close Air support" requirements.

        The Mirage 2000 aircraft, the pilots and engineers performed exceptionally well. In a very short period of time, the "Laser Guided Bombs" were made operational. No pilots or engineers and technicians were trained at the beginning of the campaign, but within a week they carried out trials and training. The accurate delivery of "Laser Bombs" on Tiger Hill - a command post in the Mashkoh sector - was devastating. Innovations like cheating the computers, for different than authorised weapon carriage, were commendable. The lasing time of the laser pods was altered manually with good results. There were no fuzes available for the 1000lb bombs, so pistol fuzes were modified and used effectively. Clearance for carriage of 1000lbs indigeneous bombs was done at Gwalior, the home base of the Mirage 2000 aircraft. There were other innovations like using the "laser designator pod" for recce. The largest logistics camps at Muntho Dalo in the Batalik sector and Pt 4388 in the Mashkoh sector were identified through this method and neutralised effectively. The Mirage 2000 aircraft flew a total of 500 missions with only three drops outs.

       The IAF flew a total of 1,235 missions, striking 24 major target systems and ensuring air dominance over the area of operations through Air Defence Interceptor aircraft like Mirage 2000 and Mig 29s.

Significant air strikes that altered the course of the conflict:

1. June 13 1999 Tololing Ridge Complex in the Batalik Sector

2. June 17 1999 Muntho Dalo the Main Admin and Lgs camp in the Batalik sector

3. June 24 1999 Command and Control structure on Tiger Hill. Direction Centrefor forward artillery in the Dras Sector.

4. June 23 1999 Logistics Camp at Pt 4388 in Mashkoh Nallah

       The Pakistan side's armed intrusion across the LoC during May to July 1999 at the Kargil sector was a misadventure with severe consequences. The Indian side had achieved its final objective of evicting the intruders with the successful Air Force-Army joint operation. The Kargil conflict was a limited Pakistani effort to internationalise the Kashmir issue, which was seen to be losing its momentum. They had assessed that a counter attack would only last a few days and, thereafter, a ceasefire through international pressure, would allow them to stay in their occupied positions and renew their supplies. The Pakistani planners failed to assess the involvement of air power, the capability of the IAF and the Indian Army's determination.

         The hesitation, at the political and military leadership, for the use of air power, delayed the induction of the IAF for over two weeks. It was nearly a repeat of the 1962 Chinese conflict, where air power was not utilised with disastrous consequences. Perhaps a "declaratory policy" to confirm that there will be no hesitation to use air power for any willful violation of the LoC or the international border is warranted. This would have a deterrant effect.

        Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance capability are of utmost importance to national security and the induction of two Pakistan Army battalions in the region should have been monitored. Gilgit, Skardu and Gulteri in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) should have been under surveillance round the year. Strategic reconnaissance is a core competency of all Air Force and in India, it is included in external intelligence gathering under R&AW (Aviation Research Centre). The gap between satellite and tactical recce (UAVs, fighters, et al) is strategic recce, which must be with the IAF and resources provided.

         The importance of technology cannot be overstated. Induction of technology would give us greater and sustainable capability, enhancing national security considerably. Do we need high tech, well trained and motivated defence forces in smaller numbers or superior forces in large numbers? Higher level military leadership must be selected through merit. During the Kargil War, it was the middle and junior level leadership that rose to the occassion. The Kargil operation would have never happened if the higher leadership had ensured realistic threat assessment and planning.

       There should be greater interaction between the political and military leadership. Thus far, it is non existent. Military leadership does not only include the chiefs of staff, but also the Air Force, Army and Navy commanders who formulate and execute the operational plans. This would expedite and rationalise the decision making process during conflict situations.

       In the final analysis, Kargil was a military, diplomatic and political success for India. However, the loss of nearly 500 military men and over 1,100 serious casualties, subdues the success. During this Kargil Diwas, we should spare a moment for the great uniformed personnel who gave their today for our tomorrow. Jai Hind.

Article by Air Marshal PS Ahluwalia posted in Daily O

The backbone of IAF transport fleet : Mi-17

 The Medium Multi role Mi-17 Helicopter

    Regarded one of the best transport helicopters, the Mi 17 is surely the most versatile and strategic asset. Designed in 1977 as a troop transport helicopter for the Soviet forces, the Mi17 soon evolved to a versatile heptor capable of handling multi-role missions and being extremely nimble on the battlefield. More than 12000 air-frame today serve across the world and have seen extensive action. The Mi-17 is undoubtedly the backbone for all copter oriented transport missions of the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Mi-17 was first procured by the IAF in the late 70’s, when India was offered the Mi-8 transport helicopter.   

      The Mi-17 was develop around the Mi-8 medium transport copter and received major boost to its lift capabilities. The Mi-17’s were provided with more powerful engines and reinforced air-frame which could support heavier payload and operate at higher altitudes. The copter was also designed to carry external wet pylons which could carry missiles. The main rotors were re-designed and larger rotors were introduced to support heavier payloads, the tail rotor was also re-designed and re-positioned towards the port side.

    Powered by twin Kilmov engines the helicopter can carry up to thirty war ready soldiers or four tonne of cargo. The twin Kilmov engines churn out 1600 kW and can power the copter to a maximum speed of 250 km/hour. The Mi-17 can traverse more than 500 kilometer at standard set up mode and enjoys a laudable 200 kilometer combat radius when operating at maximum operational load.

      The Mi-17 V5 not only serve as transport helicopters but can also be used as an attack copter, thanks to the offensive punch it packs with the guided rockets and guns. The attack capability will be a major morale booster for the soldiers deployed on the battlefield. Mi 17 is fitted with 30mm gun pod and 60mm unguided rockets which can spell havoc over enemy targets. The Mi 17 fleet under IAF, employees a meticulously combined system compromising of the cannon and rockets. Mi-17 is also provided with conformal fuel tank which is a boost in increasing the operational range of the copters.

      Owing to their huge size, the Mi-17’s are sitting ducks waiting to be fired upon by enemy SAM batteries and shoulder fired missiles. But this has been meticulously worked out by equipping the copter with advanced countermeasure suites which can evade and out manoeuvre missiles. Information regarding the exact counter measure remains to be extremely skeptical, Russian Mi 17 has been spotted gearing the Ukrainian made ADROS counter measure systems which are part of the Indian Mi-35 attack helicopter fleet. The Indian version of the Mi 17 is rumored to be fitted with the Israeli made C-MUSIC directional counter measure systems, this DIRCM is capable of engaging infrared guided missiles.

       India currently operates more than 150 Mi 8 and nearly 70 Mi-17 V5 copters. The Mi-8 airframes are rapidly aging and a replacement is the need of the hour for the transport wing of IAF.  IAF has now come with an ambitious plan of replacing the Mi-8’s with advanced Mi-17’s which can be rapidly inducted into the air force. By 2008 India had concluded a contract with Russia to supply 80 Mi 17 helicopters under a deal estimated at $1.4 billion. The first set of five Mi 17 V5 helicopters was delivered to India in early 2012, impressed with the performance of these beasts India opted for a follow on order for 71 more Mi-17 helicopters at a whooping $1.3 billion deal. IAF is contemplating of procuring 48 more helicopters at an estimated $1 billion dollar deal.

     The Mi-17’s are highly regarded in the IAF for their capabilities and ruggedness. The Mi-17 was used initially in the ‘Kargil operation’ to ferry troops to front-line but was later pulled off taking into account the higher position of the enemies. The Mi-17 has been efficiently used in humanitarian missions supported by the IAF. These Mi-17s have served as the backbone for all rescue missions operated by the IAF.  Mi-17 was also part of the ‘Cross-border special operation’ carried out by the 21st Para contingent.  The Mi-17 V5 copters are also used to ferry the Indian President and the Prime Minister proving the level of confidence put into the aircraft by India. Thus the addition of Mi-17 to the force is a major boost to the operational capability of IAF.

Editor Karthik Kakoor 

Pakistan Army and Indian Strategy

Pakistan Army and Indian Strategy

Gen VK Singh

       It is generally acknowledged that while countries have armies, the Pakistani army has a country because of its hold on every organ of the country; polity, administration, finance, judiciary, you name it.

        That the country’s foreign policy and state policy of terrorism is made and executed by the military is too well known. Eminent Pakistani scholars like Ayesha Siddiqa have exposed the stranglehold of the military over the country and the Pakistani military’s private-corporate complex that ranges from flying private aircraft to multiple businesses, which stood at US$ 20.7 billion in 2007. According to our intelligence agencies the ISI is linked with some 14 major terrorist organisations. Moreover, part of the polity and administration is subservient to the military-radicals nexus. Not only is the manpower base of the military, terrorist organisations and political parties common but some political parties and politicians survive through radical support. That is why Shahbaz Sharif (Nawaz Sharif’s brother) as Chief Minister of Pakistan’s Punjab dishes out millions of Rupees to radical organisations. That is why Sartaj Aziz, current Adviser to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on National Security and Foreign Affairs officially states,

Pakistan should not target militants who do not threaten the country’s security.”

      So, terrorist organisations like LeT and its front organisations are free to terrorise India, Haqqanis can target Indian assets in Afghanistan and Hafiz Saeed is the coordinator for directing terror against India. This rabid mullah was sighted along the LoC while Pakistan violated even the international border in Jammu region. Additionally, Pakistani daily ‘The Nation’ of 3rd March 2015 reveals Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and associates live as State’s honoured guest in Adiala jail (few kilometers from Army’s GHQ), allowing him to operate his personal command centre from where he monitors global happenings, meet his subordinates, and issues directions.

       It may be recalled that when Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled by bus to Lahore with an extended hand of friendship, Pervez Musharraf as the serving army chief refused to shake hands with Mr Vajpayee. It is a different issue that Musharraf was already going ahead with the Kargil intrusions and later demeaned and disgraced his military uniform and service by refusing to take back the bodies of his soldiers killed in the Kargil Conflict showcasing them as infiltrators. But just as Nawaz Sharif could not prevail upon Musharraf to shake hands with PM Vajpayee, sitting in the same chair of the PM of Pakistan today Nawaz Shariff dare not take any follow up action against Musharraf even as he stands indicted for the killing of Baloch leader Nawaz Akbar Khan  Bugti in 2006. So one side we have a Pakistani army chief bluntly snubbing PM Vajpayee in presence of Nawaz Sharif and the other extreme what happened during the recent celebrations of Pakistan Day at the Pakistani embassy at New Delhi with General VK Singh deputed to attend the function as MoS (External Affairs), with media focusing why VK Singh was wearing a green jacket, why was he smiling smiles and above all why his tweets about ‘duty’ among ‘disgust’?

        So let us examine the propriety of sending a former Army Chief to this function irrespective if he was the MoS (Home) or not, even it is the prerogative of the government. A dozen people spoken to including serving and veteran soldiers say their first reaction on viewing TV coverage was ‘what is our former Army Chief doing inside the fox’s lair that accommodates and connives with separatists’? A former diplomat friend had a better remark – jab politics join kiya hai to besharam to banna parega (when you join politics, you should be prepared to be shameless). Looking more closely, did we need to avoid such situation and how could we have done so? The event in the Pakistani embassy was in immediate aftermath of Pakistan backed terrorist attacks on a police station and an army post in J&K. The day after the event media published IB warning that terrorist attacks in J&K are likely to be stepped up in conjunction Pakistani army, so this would have been known to the government on Pakistan day. Pakistan’s proxy war continues unabated and was so during the tenure of Gen VK Singh as Army Chief that caused loss of lives.

          It is a matter of perception how presence of a former army chief, in company of separatists, in the embassy of country who is waging endless proxy war on India adversely affects the prestige of our country and the military. Unfortunately, this is not understood by many – perhaps that’s why the friendly advice to become shameless! That the mafia linked bureaucracy would have enjoyed the discomfiture of Gen VK Singh is without doubt, they having hounded him ever since he exposed corruption in the higher echelons while in service including the Tatra Scam. Then the prestige of the military has also been played with by media houses some of whom have dubious aims akin to NGOs. We have on record individuals with mafia connections indulging in malicious and mischievous rumour mongering like army coups and the polity preferring to remain mute for obvious reasons. Of course, where is the question of agreeing with Lee Kuan Yew when he said press and news freedom must subordinate to overriding need for integrity of Singapore.

   Hiding behind the logic that attendance of MoS (Home) was as per protocol does not gel. Protocols like this are not laid down by an international body but are government prerogative that can be modified when required. Witness Abdul Basit being issued a demarche last year when entertaining separatists that led to even cancellation of the Foreign Secretary level talks and now the beyond 360 degrees turn by treating separatists visiting the Pakistani embassy as routine. The situation could have been easily avoided by deputing any other MoS to attend the event, without the need of any explanation. Post the capture of the strategic Haji Pir Pass, PM Lal Bahadur Shastri deputed the Minister of Information & Broadcasting, not the Defence Minister to visit the troops at the Haji Pir Pass. Admittedly, the Haji Pir Pass is not the Pakistani Embassy and the former visit did not require any protocol, but visit to the former was far more important to the embassy of a country that cannot control its rogue army.

      Without doubt the government initiative to open talks with Pakistan is laudable. But it has happened time and again in the past including most prominently during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s premiership. US pressure for such talks is also a reality, no matter how much we deny it, with Uncle Sam siding with the Pakistani military overlooking latter’s terrorism and even nuclear proliferation. The government naturally denies any such pressure but when the Foreign Secretary embarked on his recent SAARC tour, it was surmised as a cover to primarily dialogue Pakistan. Old Fox Sartaj Aziz rubbed it in by saying America has pressurised India for talks with Pakistan. Post the Pak National Day event, Abdul Basit went boisterous in announcing that in his opinion India has no objections to their (Pakistani embassy) meetings with Hurriyat leaders. Though MEA clarified later that there is no place for a third party in talks with Pakistan and the resolution of the issues between the neighbouring countries will be carried out by their respective governments, Basit’s shows the intention of Pakistan.

        Writing in a Kolkatta based publication New Approach exclusive titled ‘India-Pakistan Challenges Way Forward’, Sartaj Aziz, writes, “India is not ready to plebiscite under the UNSC resolution from which it reneged after 1954.” If this is the Pakistani stance knowing full well while the 1949 UN Resolution called for plebiscite, it categorically ruled that before the plebiscite Pakistan must withdraw all its security forces from territory of J&K. Pakistan not only reinforced her security forces in J&K but also changed the demography of area through large number of settlers from the plains, which continues to-date, killing the plebiscite issue altogether. Yet Pakistan’s continuous clamour for plebiscite indicates they are not interested to resolve issues as for the Pakistani military to remain in power, sub-conventional conflict with neighbours is necessary.

      Mohammad Umer Daudzai, Afghanistan’s Interior Minister till December 2014 (with earlier tenures as ambassador in Iran and Afghanistan) wrote in his article titled ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan: The False Promise of Rapprochement’ in the New York Times on 2 March 2015 that there is no change in the basic stance of Pakistan against Afghanistan and that the Pakistan military continues to treat the Afghan Taliban as strategic assets. In our case, it is good to continue talking but we should be prepared for similar response. There is no reason to go overboard either especially where we have a chief minister in J&K who thanks Pakistan for his throne while his family  candidate electioneering even during 2001 supported radical Hijbul cadres as bodyguards. But then the Centre would have taken all this into account with Pakistan’s game plan of removing AFSPA from large areas of J&K if not altogether. This would be enough to raise insurgency levels without the need for the Pakistani army to mount another Kargil, as Musharraf had been threatening. It is amusing to note some scholars writing that space needs to be given to Hurriyat hardliners but pray what has been happening till now? Pakistan may consider their protégés as representative of J&K but that is a far cry from the ground reality. Frankly, they are nonentities that would automatically vanish if denied media publicity.

         The need of the hour is remain pragmatic without going overboard. There is no requirement to go to the other extreme to appease an insolent Pakistan.  Hopefully return of 54 Indian Prisoners of War will figure prominently in the talks, even as Sartaj Aziz in his above mentioned article only talks of captive fishermen. We are not fooling anyone by putting it in the media that the recent attacks in J&K were undertaken by terrorists to boost their low morale. More importantly, the Pakistani military may have already planned the next terrorist strike on India, complicity to which as always will be denied.

 Article Posted in Niti Central Posted by Lt. Gen PrakashKatoch

Typical day in Bakistan with Bomb blasts

Bakistani Soldiers also Look like LeT and Taliban Terrorists

kargil War:A Story Of Gurkha in His Own words

Kargil War:A Story Of Gurkha in His Own words

Colonel Lalit Rai being decorated with Vir Chakra by President K R Narayanan

Col. Lalit Rai (Vir Chakra) ..... Pope House
Undiluted Heroism

        I am third generation in the army and that too in the same Regiment. After I was commissioned, I joined 11 GORKHA RIFLES, the Regiment that my grandfather and father belonged to - it's like a tradition. I got commissioned into 7/11 GORKHA RIFLES. This incidentally, was not the battalion that I led into battle. The battalion I was destined to lead, into a fierce series of battles during 'OP VIJAY' was 1/11 GORKHA RIFLES, the one my father had been commissioned into about 42 years ago.

     I had been posted to various places, served in every type of terrain conceivable - from deserts, mountains, jungles, ravines, plains, high altitudes, super-high altitudes - you name it. And after various instructional and staff appointments, took over the command of the 17 RASHTRIYA RIFLES( MARATHA LI ), a newly raised battalion in J&K, designed to combat insurgency and militancy. Command of a RASHTRIYA RIFLES Battalion is considered a very tough and a challenging assignment. I had promptly agreed to the offer for the command of 17 RR. I took it as a big challenge, firstly, because the troops were from the MARATHA Regiment, mostly hailing from in and around Pune, quite different from the troops I had been commanding throughout my career till then, and secondly, commanding a battalion in a militant infested area has its fair share of risks and tensions. However it did not take me long to realise that the Gorkha and the Maratha troops were so much like each other in so many ways, as events and achievements of the battalion would unfold later and substantiate my claim. I enjoyed and loved every moment of my command tenure with my MARATHA boys and we hit it off like a house on fire.

          For my battalion I had designed a memento using a grenade as my model. A Grenade looks so simple, but if you pull out the pin, you know what happens, right? Simple, but Lethal: that's the motto (which graces the base of the memento) I adopted for my battalion, because that's what it was! This has since become the Motto for the 17 RASHTRIYA RIFLES, whom I'd christened the 'Stormy Seventeen' because we created a virtual storm for the militants, thereby making it extremely difficult for them to survive in our area of responsibility. We'd created some sort of a record there, by eliminating the maximum number of militants, and getting a sizeable number of them to surrender. Since our area of responsibility was very large with hundreds of villages under us, everyday threw up different types of problems and challenges. All these incidents added richly to our experience. This kept me quite engrossed and extremely busy, throughout my tenure there.

     OPERATION VIJAY happened in Kargil, while I was busy combating militants elsewhere in the same state. This was somewhere in the first week of May 2001. By the time the actual fighting developed, it was almost the end of May and by now people had realised that the Pak army was fully involved and it wasn't just some militants. 1/11 GORKHA RIFLES had the privilege of being the first battalion to be rushed in for 'OP VIJAY'. At that point of time, my 'Colonel Of The Regiment' (a very senior officer of the Regiment is appointed as the Colonel Of The Regiment, to oversee regimental issues as also do the command planning for the battalions of the Regiment. He is considered to be the father figure of the Regiment) contacted me. He said, `The previous Commanding Officer of 1/11 GR has taken premature retirement and gone, the battalion is presently in the thick of battle,' and asked, 'Would you like to take over the fight and do something about it?' Lt Gen J B S Yadava, AVSM, VrC, VSM, who is presently the Deputy Chief Of Army Staff, was also my commanding officer in 7/11 GR when I was a young officer. I was his adjutant and I had really learnt a lot from this veteran and Vir Chakra award winner of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. He probably had faith in me and was banking on me to do something for the battalion in that difficult hour.

        I didn't hesitate; I said, `definitely.' But he also added, 'I know it is unfair on my part to ask you to take up this tough assignment, especially when the Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and the troops are new to you.' (Remember, I was coming back to the Regiment after serving with the Rashtriya Rifles). Even the terrain was absolutely new to me, the information about the enemy at that point of time was not adequate; things were not all that clear. I wasn't exactly in a very enviable situation. I had however convinced myself that I would take a chance. I was anyway combating uncertainty day and night. Earlier, I had this huge guesthouse to myself in Doda district and every night I used to sleep in a different room, as we used to be under rocket and machine-gun attacks regularly. In fact, when days passed by without some firing or some incident, I used to feel that something was missing! All that of course changed later, as they never even dared to venture anywhere near us. We had successfully managed to dominate our area of responsibility fully, after months of relentless and successful operations against the militant groups.

        Once I accepted the offer to command 1/11 GR, they moved me by helicopter within 48 hours and dropped me bang in the middle of the battle-zone. Many operations were going on in full swing at various places in the front. The moment I landed at the base, there was heavy shelling by the enemy artillery and my reception party ran helter-skelter for cover. My reception was now complete with the enemy also chipping in with their artillery shelling. All of us, of course had to dive for cover, this gave me an indication of the difficult times that lay ahead of us.

         In a month's time through vigorous effort, I improved and consolidated my battalions posture against the enemy. I got to know the boys, visited every piquet and reconnoitered the complete area of responsibility. By end June I had learnt a lot about the enemy and his capabilities…and was now adequately prepared, given the situation. In the Batalik sector where my battalion was now located, the terrain was really tough and unforgiving, compounded with the most inhospitable weather. After due deliberation and reconnaissance everyone, right upto the highest commander, had more or less assessed that if the formidable and dominating enemy position at Khalubar was to be captured, the complete area would become more or less untenable by the enemy. But the problem was that Khalubar was located at an altitude of 17500 metres above mean sea level, with the enemy sitting well entrenched, with lethal and sophisticated weapons in a dominating position, it was also located deep in the heart of the enemy defences. This implied that the attacker would be under enemy fire right from the word go. The attack would also have to be made uphill under accurate and intense enemy fire. The next logical question was 'who is going to capture it and how? When I volunteered for this seemingly impossible task, people thought I had gone bonkers!

           To cut the story short, I led my battalion to battle from the front, into one of the fiercest battles of 'OP VIJAY'. As a commanding officer you are expected to be sufficiently forward with the troops, but not actually lead the assault like I did. The main role of the Commanding Officer is to plan and coordinate well and provide good leadership at all times. Being new I really had no choice but to lead physically from the front on that fateful day of July 1999.




         It took us 14 hours of extremely torturous and dangerous marching with heavy loads of arms, ammunition, winter clothing, and other special equipment for negotiating the steep snow covered slopes, rations, etc. to reach the objective. Throughout the move we came under heavy enemy small arms fire and artillery shelling. The intensity and the accuracy of the enemy's fire grew even as we laboriously plodded our way up through snow and sharp jagged rocks at steep inclines. The prevalent temperature at this time was about minus 29 degrees Celsius. A real marrow chilling temperature, which numbs your whole body and deadens the senses.

          We had started the attack with a few hundred people. We had closed in to about 600 yards of the enemy position, when the firing became very intense and effective and it seemed impossible to proceed further against this curtain of lead and fire from the tracer bullets. You could see the bullets and rockets hurtling towards us with fearsome intensity and sound. My heart still shudders when I remember the heart wrenching screams and cries of my boys who fell under this wilting fire from the enemy's heavy machine gun as also from his Air Defence gun. The sight of my boys battered, torn and ripped apart by machine gun fire, bleeding profusely, still haunts me, and I often wake up sweating and gasping for air from such nightmares. It was a real test for me, egging the boys on, towards almost certain death, from effective and intensive enemy fire. To close in with the enemy and finish him off before he finished us off. At this point of time I focused myself totally to the immediate task ahead of me - to capture the objective and nothing else. All thought of the family and home was totally blocked out, to rule out even one percent chance of any weakening in my resolve. We pushed ahead despite heavy casualties with approximately 30 - 40 soldiers whom I could muster. The others were either injured or pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Maximum casualties were being caused by fire coming from Khalubar top while the other was from a flank, which, we later named 'Bunker Area'. I decided to capture the top, with the 40 men I could muster, and sent Capt Manoj Pandey to capture and silence Bunker Area with approximately 30 men. We charged up towards the enemy position, chopping enemy heads enroute, and succeeded in capturing the top. When I took a quick head count on top, there were only eight of us left, who were fit enough to fight.


        It was literally an uphill task, almost like a scene straight out of Charge of the Light Brigade! The gradients we had to negotiate were between 75° and 80°! It was snowing and extremely cold. The rock that we were climbing was of the jagged variety that chops you to the quick if you make one false move! To top this worst-case scenario possible, there was that enemy fire coming on us right from the top! The enemy could see our every move from the top!

           But my Gorkha boys really proved their worth in gold and were unstoppable; I have to doff my hat to my boys! Where normal guys would have had a tough time even walking in those altitudes, my boys sprinted! They charged up and when we were at close quarters with the enemy, my boys did what they had been dying to do for so long, they removed their khukris and started chopping enemy heads. As we charged up, I could see the heads rolling down. When the enemy saw that - they couldn't hold themselves any longer. They just got up and started running away in sheer terror.

       So like I mentioned earlier, we were just eight of us, bang in the middle of an enemy position. It became imperative that we hold on to it. It was equally critical for the enemy to push us out because we were not only dominating their replenishment route i.e. for additional arms and ammunition, rations and things like that, but we were also cutting off their route of retreat. So they launched counter attack after counter attack and there I was, with eight chaps holding on resolutely and repulsing attack after attack.

       It was almost an impossible task. The enemy would muster up about a platoon (about 30 to 40 troops) and start creeping up slowly and attack us! And with just eight guys, you can imagine just how thin my defense was! Any direction of attack would have only met with one or two rifle fire, however I had all eight guys facing every counter attack. And that was only possible because on a parallel mountain spur, a few kilometers away, I had my troops holding defences against the enemy. So the company commander, whose company was on the other mountain spur, was watching our desperate stand through a pair of binoculars and he became my eyes from that side.

        He would tell me, 'Sir, there are now 40 chaps to your left coming at you through the big boulder&' and we would shoot those guys down. And I'm pretty sure that the enemy haven't yet figured out as to how we managed to know their exact route up. I'm sure they must have thought that we were almost a company atop this position. Quite a few of us were already injured; I had got a bullet in my leg and splinters in my calf and had begun to bleed profusely. Towards the end, a situation arose where I had only two bullets left with me in my rifle - and that rifle belonged to my dead radio operator. In my hurry and concern for my boys and the task, I had literally taken off in my full uniform and I had even forgotten to remove my red collar dogs. I realized my folly much, much later&;when I was in the thick of battle. So when I found out that I was down to the last two bullets, I made a quick resolve, one bullet for myself when it comes to that. As for the other one, I decided to take one chap with me before I went.

         My boys were also quite tensed up, when they all realised that our moment of reckoning was finally staring us in the eye. I mean, when you realize that your death is arriving within a few minutes time, it becomes that much more agonising and difficult. On the other hand when you don't know, and death comes to you suddenly, it is okay and is probably a part of life. But here it was approaching us in another few minutes& so I quickly bid a mental goodbye to everyone I held dear to me. I was suddenly woken up from my reverie by the crackle of my radio set. It was my officer from the other mountain position, with a frantic message, 'Sir, I can see about 35 men moving up for another counter attack&;" I thought to myself, 'Boy! This is it; the moment has finally come to say 'adieu'

       My boys also looked at me for some reaction, I could feel the palpable tension in the air. I have always believed: a dash of humour can really relieve a lot of tension in your life. I had to alleviate their tension quickly and firm their resolve to fight to the end. The were- were cursing and using the choicest of abuses even as they advanced, I gave it back to them in equal measure, with all the Punjabi that I knew. I turned to my boys and said, ' Dushman tumhare commanding officer Saab ko gaali de rahe hain aur tum log chup-chaap baithe ho?!' Now funny thing is that a Gorkha Johnny doesn't know how to give gaalis, and as far as discipline and obedience goes, he is unmatchable.

           So they looked at each other and I could read the look in their eyes, it said, 'Saab ne hukum diya hai toh gaali dena hi padega. They looked around and wondered, who could perform this difficult task, and finally nominated one amongst them to give the gaalis. He got up and bellowed seriously, Pakistani *****, tum idhar aayega toh tumhara mundi kaat degaa! I turned around and told him, 'The Pakistanis will surely die& but they will die laughing that Gyan Bahadur can't even give proper gaalis !' They all broke into laughter and that kind of revved them up and got their josh back up again&and they all said, 'Abo tah kukri nikalera taeslai thik paarchhu&; (We will take out our khukris now and sort him out) we'll fight

         I radioed the Artillery Officer attached with us, located on the other mountain spur of 'Kukarthang' and asked him whether he knew where I was, and he replied in the affirmative. I then asked him to use me as a reference and give me several rounds of rapid-fire support. He was shocked! He tentatively wondered whether I really wanted him to direct our own Artillery fire, approximately 100-odd rounds on my head. We are talking about the Bofors round with its devastating effect - its such a powerful gun! I had to take a chance; I preferred to die there by own gunfire, rather than get captured by the enemy. And by now, even the enemy knew that our ammunition was running low&and as the seconds ticked by, the enemy crept closer and closer 40 yards&30;35 yards;25 yards& I yelled at him and said that I didn't have the time and to just do what he was told! He did and I could hear the deadly whistling screech of the shells (usually the fore bearers of death) coming at us, from the Gun position several kilometres behind us. My boys and I took shelter in the cracks of the huge boulders and the 100-odd rounds thundered and crashed all around us with a beautiful but deadly blast of shrapnel and flame. The temperatures suddenly rose due to the burning cordite and for a few seconds, we were engulfed in comfortable warmth, in otherwise the prevalent freezing cold. We could literally see the Pakistanis (who were advancing in the open), being blown to smithereens right in front of us. They didn't know what had hit them. Several times they tried to close in for the kill, since we had no ammunition left, but with the help of our accurate and prompt artillery gunners we sent them reeling back with heavy casualties.

           We held on to the position for 36 hours without a wink of sleep or a drop of water to drink. We had not eaten a morsel of food for over 48 hours and were weak because of hunger and the freezing cold. After 36 hours or so, we shifted our position slightly away, as a deceptive measure. Meanwhile my second-in-command moved up with the reinforcements and we finally consolidated our position. KHALUBAR finally was ours. Victory gained after such great sacrifice of my brave boys was perhaps the sweetest thing for me, and nothing, repeat nothing, can ever better that.
 

      As correctly assessed by all of us, once Khalubar fell, the Pakistanis ran from all the adjoining areas! We subsequently routed them from 11 formidable positions and we quickly pushed them across the LOC - line of control. The 'GORKHAS' had created such terror and dread in the minds of the Pakistanis that when one of the Prisoners of war (POWs) was captured; his FIRST request was to see a GORKHA soldier. I asked one of my boys to go to him and pull out his khukri, It was a funny sight.

     The nations highest gallantry award, the PARAM VIR CHAKRA was awarded posthumously to young Capt. Manoj Pandey&;for his valour and supreme sacrifice in the battle of Khalubar. For its sterling performance, the battalion was awarded a unit citation. We also earned the title of 'THE BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE' for having won a Param Vir Chakra and an Ashok Chakra (Lt Puneet Dutt had earlier won the AC in J&K in '98). For individual acts of bravery we won a bagful of gallantry awards. The President awarded me the Vir Chakra for inspirational leadership and conspicuous bravery of a very high order.

- Col. Lalit Rai, VrC